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Despite  being  fundamental  to  democracy,  the  normative  concept  of  the  people,  i.e.  the 
demos, is highly unclear.  This article clarifies the legitimacy of the demos’ boundaries by 
structuring  the  debate  into  three  strains  of  justification:  first,  normative  membership 
principles;  second,  its  democratic  functionality  and  the  necessity  of  cohesion  for  this 
essential function; and third, a procedural understanding of the demos. It will be shown that 
normative  principles  can  only  justify  its  expansion  towards  the  ideal  of  an  unbounded 
demos. On the other hand, the democratic function of the demos can be understood as a  
criterion for its restriction. This, however, is only possible on the basis of an existing polity 
and not for the initial constitution of the demos. Consequently, a legitimate demos has to 
take both inclusionary and exclusionary tendencies into account. These tendencies need to 
be weighed against each other in the democratic process, which leads to a fundamentally 
procedural understanding of the legitimacy of the demos.
Introduction: The Demos as a Normative 
Concept1
Democracy  as  the  government  of  the  people  refers 
fundamentally  to  the  idea  of  a  people,  i.e.  a  demos,  for  its 
legitimation.2 However,  as  Jennings  famously  stated:  “The 
people cannot decide until someone decides who are the people” 
(Jennings  1956,  56).  This  implies  that  democracy  as  self-
legislation  and  self-constitution  is  always  connected  to  the 
drawing of boundaries (Besson 2006). The initial constitution of 
the  demos in  democratic  terms  is  highly  problematic  and  is 
therefore  often  referred  to  as  the  “boundary  problem”  (Dahl 
1970; Whelan 1983; Franck 1992; Gould 2006; Abizadeh 2008; 
Miller 2009; List and König-Archibugi 2010; Cheneval 2011). 
The problem is that democracy always needs a specified body of 
members to participate in the democratic process of decision-
making. However, for the initial founding decision of the demos, 
its boundaries are not yet established and it is therefore unclear 
who should take part in the decision-making. This means that the 
determination of the boundaries of the self-governing unit can 
1 For valuable comments on previous versions, I thank Arash 
Abizadeh, Jan Pieter Beetz, Francis Cheneval, Carina Fourie, 
Sofia Näsström, Ivo Wallimann-Helmer, and participants at the 
Political Philosophy research seminar (University of Zurich); the 
1st Congress: Democracy Today Theory, Braga, 2010; and the 
Dreiländertagung, 2011 Basel. I would also like to express my 
gratitude to the two anonymous reviewers for many helpful 
suggestions in the completion of the article. This research was 
supported by the National Centre of Competence in Research 
Challenges to Democracy in the 21st Century.
2 In the following, I will understand the term “people” as a 
political people of a polity, equivalent to “demos.”
itself never occur in a democratic procedure because this would 
presuppose  the  existence  of  this  very  unit.  Nevertheless, 
democracy needs a clearly delimitated demos in order to make 
decisions. Therefore, the question arises of how a demos can be 
constituted in a legitimate way.3 Previously, this issue was rarely 
discussed  in  political  theory  since  most  authors  argued  that 
questions  concerning  the  constitution  of  the  demos  escape 
democratic  possibilities  (Dahl  1989;  Whelan  1983).  Due  to 
increasing migration and globalisation,  however,  this question 
has gained importance (Näsström 2007; Goodin 2007; Abizadeh 
2008; Miller 2009; List and König-Archibugi 2010).
The legitimacy of the demos is highly relevant to democratic 
theory as  a  self-referential  theory in  which political  power is 
legitimised  in  reference  to  the  individuals  over  whom  it  is 
exercised (Abizadeh 2012). The legitimacy of the demos lies at 
the heart of democratic theory for two main reasons. First, the 
legitimacy of claims made in the name of the people depends not 
only  on the  decision-making  process,  but  also  on the  subject 
making  the  decision.  So  if  the  legitimacy  of  the  demos  is 
questionable,  the legitimacy of  democratic decision-making is 
also undermined. Second, the legitimacy of the demos affects its 
right  to  exclude  others.  If  the  composition  of  the  demos  is 
arbitrary, its right to the self-determination of its members might 
not  be  valid. Hence,  the  demos  as  a  collective  subject  is  of 
crucial  importance  for  the  legitimacy  of  democracy  itself. 
However, the conception of the demos’ legitimacy suffers from a 
dramatic  lack  of  clarity.  Empirically,  it  is  not  a  problem  to 
identify  the  particular  citizens  of  a  state  who  constitute  the 
demos.  Yet  the  broader  conceptual  and  specifically  the 
normative dimensions of the concept of the demos are vague.
3 When speaking of the constitution of the demos, I do not mean 
the historical events but mainly the theoretical possibility of its 
legitimate constitution.
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This  paper  aims  to  clarify  these  conceptual  and  normative 
dimensions.  Essentially, the question guiding this paper is: who 
should be  included in  the  demos? This  means addressing the 
demos not only as the basis, but also as the object, of legitimacy. 
The  main  contribution  of  this  paper  is  then  to  provide  a 
comprehensive understanding of the legitimacy of the demos. As 
a starting point, I examine whether the demos can be constituted 
democratically and what “democratic” can mean in this context. 
In so doing, this paper structures the debate over the legitimacy 
of the demos and provides a systematic evaluation of different 
accounts. 
The criteria  of  legitimacy should answer both who should be 
included  in  the  demos  and  in  which  cases  exclusion  can  be 
legitimised.  I will show that three different accounts or criteria 
of the legitimacy of the demos can be identified in the literature: 
first, according to normative principles; second, as a functional 
democratic  unit;  and  third,  through  a  reconstitution  process. 
Accordingly,  in  the  first  part  of  this  paper  I  will  consider 
different normative membership principles  of the demos. Such 
membership  criteria  include  the  all-affected  principle,  all-
subjected principle,  the principle  of  voluntary association and 
the unbounded demos thesis. It will be demonstrated that these 
normative principles cannot define a delimited demos as they are 
either  based  on  an  existing  demos  or  they  criticise  every 
restriction  of  the  demos  in  the  name  of  more  inclusion. The 
normative principles can thus only legitimise the expansion but 
not  the  restriction  of  the  demos.  Since  restriction  remains 
necessary for democratic decision-making – the key function of 
the demos – this democratic functionality of the demos should 
itself  serve as a delimitation criterion,  as I  will  outline in the 
second part. Regarding this democratic function of the demos, I 
will evaluate which function the demos is expected to fulfil and 
what quality a collective subject requires in order to do so. In 
order to answer these questions, I will review different accounts 
of demos cohesion or identity and evaluate their compatibility 
with democratic principles. If the function of the demos is used 
as  a  restriction criterion,  the kind of  cohesion assumed to be 
necessary for it has to be examined from a normative point of 
view.
These two opposing tendencies of inclusion and exclusion faced 
by  the  demos  have  also  been  discussed  by  Miller  (2009). 
However, he does not elaborate on the normativity of different 
kinds of cohesion as bases for exclusion. Furthermore, it needs 
to be specifically considered that these two tendencies are not 
constitution principles for the first foundation of the demos, but 
can  only  be  enacted  in  a  procedural  manner.  This  leads  to  a 
procedural understanding of the legitimacy of the demos, which 
I  will  discuss  in  the  third  part.  Since  the  demos  cannot  be 
founded in an initially legitimate way, the demos should not be 
understood as a substantial singularity but rather as procedurally 
defined and justified. This means that it has to be reconstituted 
and examined over and over again in the democratic process. 
I Normative Membership Principles 
Generally speaking,  the demos can be defined as the political 
subject of a polity, constituted by its members, who participate 
or  have  the  right  to  participate  in  political  decision-making 
(Aristotle 1985, 87; 1275a20). In this sense, the demos is defined 
as  the  individuals  having  participation  rights.  The  demos  is 
sometimes also equated with full membership or citizenship in a 
polity. However, citizenship  is  commonly  understood  as 
containing  four  different  elements:  status,  rights,  political 
engagement  and  identity  (e.g.  Bosniak  2006).  Some  authors 
understand  status  and rights  as  one aspect  (e.g.  Cohen 1999; 
Carens 2000) but there is nevertheless consensus in the literature 
about which elements constitute citizenship. The legal status of 
citizenship defines the members of a political  community and 
ascribes rights and duties. The rights of citizenship entail civil, 
political  and  social  rights  (e.g.  Marshall  1950).  Active 
citizenship  can  be  understood  as  the  republican  ideal  which 
requires  civic  virtues  for  self-government.4 Citizenship  can 
further be understood as an affective element of identification 
with  a  shared  identity.5 While  these  four  elements  are  not 
mutually  exclusive  aspects  of  one  large  conceptual  whole  of 
citizenship with different legal,  psychological and behavioural 
perspectives  (Bosniak 2006,  20),  they are  dependent  on  each 
other in different ways. For example, the legal aspect secures the 
active political participation aspect and vice versa. The relevant 
aspect  of  citizenship  for  the  definition  of  the  demos  as  the 
political subject of a polity is political rights, since they formally 
guarantee  participation  in  political  decision-making.  These 
political  rights  are of course part  of full  citizenship,  however 
they  are  not  to  be  taken  as  equivalent  since  the  status  of  
citizenship can also occur without political rights (for example, 
in the case of children, citizens residing abroad or convicts) and, 
in  some  states,  political  rights  can  be  acquired  without  full  
citizenship.6 In  the  following,  I  will  refer  to  the  demos  as 
defined through participation rights. The importance of identity 
or cohesion for the demos will be discussed in the second part of 
this paper. 
The  definition  of  the  demos  through  rights  of  political 
participation leads primarily to  a descriptive understanding of 
the demos. Such an understanding would designate the group of 
individuals  who  have  decision-making  rights  as  the  demos. 
However,  in  authoritarian  forms  of  polities,  for  example,  the 
right  of  political  participation  might  be  so  restricted  that  the 
demos merges with the government. Even though it is possible 
in  an  authoritarian  polity  to  detect  the  group  with  decision-
making  rights,  we  would  hardly  call  it  a  legitimate  demos 
because it does not fulfil any participatory normative standard.7 
Besides  these  descriptive  elements,  the  demos  also  has  a 
normative  aspect.  For  example,  if  the  majority  of  the  adult 
population has no opportunity to participate in political decision-
making and the deciding group is a small elite, we would not  
call this elite the demos.8 We would still refer to the citizens as 
the basis of legitimation and, in this sense, as the demos, even if  
they  do  not  have  any rights  of  participation.  In  other  words, 
there is a descriptive understanding of the demos which answers 
only the question of who actually has participatory rights in a 
4 For a discussion of the relevance of civic virtues for the liberal 
state, see Galston (1991).
5 For a discussion about the relationship between group rights 
and citizenship, see Kymlicka and Norman (2000).
6 This focus on political rights is not meant to neglect the 
importance of civic and social rights and active participation for 
the effective use of political rights.
7 This should not imply that democracy would be reached 
through extensive participation rights alone, but that the 
normativity of the demos does not allow an authoritarian regime 
to be qualified as a legitimate demos, even if this could be 
achieved from the descriptive point of view.
8 It is true that in representative democracies citizens cannot 
participate in every political decision; but since they can elect 
their representative, they have political rights to be sovereign in 
the sense of the demos.
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polity,  and  a  normative  understanding  of  the  demos  which 
justifies or questions the distribution of political rights and, in 
this sense, the borders of the polities themselves. 
This normative aspect of the demos is specifically relevant to 
democracy.  Democracy  always  requires  a  subject,  a  body  of 
people in its process of collective equal decision-making. This 
means that the extension of participation rights is normatively 
linked to the principle of equality, which forbids the restriction 
of  the  demos  to  a  small  elite  that  rules  over  the  others.  It 
therefore makes sense to speak of a demos first and foremost as 
the subject of democracy. Or, as López-Guerra puts it, it is not 
just the democratic procedures that are determinative, but also 
“who governs or, alternatively, who holds ultimate power over 
those who govern” (López-Guerra  2005,  218).  The normative 
question  of  the  demos’ composition  is  therefore  specifically 
relevant to democracies: who has to be included in the demos for 
it to be the basis of legitimate decision-making? This question 
addresses not only internal inclusion, which has historically been 
marked  by  the  extension  of  political  rights  to  several  groups 
such  as  women  or  Afro-Americans,  but  also  the  external 
delimitation of the demos. 
The boundary problem of democratic theory is that the initial 
definition  of  the  demos’  boundaries  can  never  occur  in  a 
procedural democratic way. As Whelan puts it, the boundaries of 
the self-governing unit  have to be determined because,  unlike 
individuals and humanity, which are naturally defined, groups of 
collective government are not (Whelan 1983, 15). So the issue of 
the boundary problem is a question of membership and, as such, 
distinct  from territorial  concerns (e.g.  Goodin  2007).  Whelan 
(1983) famously stated that democratic theory cannot offer an 
answer  to  this  problem without  circularity.  However,  he  also 
argues that the determination of political membership is itself a 
political  decision,  perhaps  the  most  fundamental  one,  and 
therefore democratic theory cannot simply take the matter for 
granted  (Whelan  1983,  16).  In  contrast,  Schumpeter (2006) 
considers the  question of  the constitution of  the demos to  be 
trivial because boundaries set by political  communities should 
simply be accepted. Hence, for him, the boundary problem is in 
fact unanswerable in democratic theory. 
Dahl differentiates the question of the constitution of the demos 
further  as  he  notes  that  the  domain  (people  included  in  the 
demos)  and  the  scope  (competences  of  the  polity)  are 
interrelated and therefore cannot be determined independently of 
each other. Even though he recognises that the problem of proper 
domain  and  scope  cannot  be  solved  from  within  democratic 
theory,  the question of  who should be included in the demos 
remains one of its most fundamental issues  (Dahl 1989, 207–
209). Others have pointed out that democracy cannot be reduced 
to decision-making procedures,  but is defined by a distinctive 
normative ideal which may also influence the determination of a 
democratically  legitimate  demos  (López-Guerra  2005,  221; 
Miller 2009, 204; Arrhenius 2005). 
In  this  first  part,  I  will  discuss  different  normative  principles 
which  define  the  legitimate  composition  of  the  demos  and 
evaluate  whether  they  provide  an  answer  to  the  boundary 
problem. First, the so-called “all-affected-interests” principle  is 
specifically discussed and is dismissed as a constitutive principle 
but acknowledged as a critical standard for the demos. Second, 
interpretations of the all-affected principle like the all-subjected 
principle, which presupposes the existence of a political unit, is 
examined.  Third,  the  concept  of  voluntary  association  is 
reviewed  with  regard  to  its  ability  to  give  guidance  for  the 
boundary problem. Finally, the option of an unbounded demos, 
defined by open deliberative participation, is discussed. I assess 
these normative principles according to the criteria of 1) non-
circularity,  2)  non-redundancy,  3)  political  equality  and  4) 
functionality. Political equality serves as an approximation to the 
democratic  ideal  (Cheneval  2011,  64).  Functionality  as  the 
ability of the demos to take democratic decisions is only applied 
as  a  minimal  restriction.  Other  options  for  reconstituting  the 
demos which rely on an already existing demos or polity will be 
discussed in the third part of the paper. 
a) All-Affected-Interests Principle
A  principle  often  referred  to  for  constituting  the  demos 
normatively  is  the  all-affected-interests  principle.  Essentially, 
this principle claims that the demos is legitimately constituted if  
those who are affected by the outcome of a decision have a say 
in the decision-making. Membership defined by this principle is 
established for specific decisions on the basis of the prospective 
impact  of  that  decision.  Dahl’s  formulation  of  the  principle 
states  that  “everyone  who  is  affected  by  the  decisions  of  a 
government  should  have  the  right  to  participate  in  that 
government” (Dahl 1970, 64). Generally, this principle seems to 
capture  the  self-government  aspect  of  democracy  very  well.9 
However, if the demos were determined for every decision, this 
would lead to a fluctuating demos, which would be problematic 
for  democratic  decision-making.  Looking  at  the  specific 
interpretations of this principle, it becomes clear that there are 
even  more  problems  linked  to  it  and  that  none  of  these 
interpretations can resolve the boundary-problem. I will follow 
the  distinction  of  1)  actually  affected  2)  proportion  of 
affectedness and 3) possibly affected, which can be found in the 
literature (e.g. Goodin 2007; Cheneval 2011).
First,  the  demos  could  be  constituted  according  to  the 
proportion  of  affectedness.  However,  this  version  leads  to 
different  constituencies of  voters for  each decision,  hence the 
principle in this form is not useful for the constitution of a stable 
demos, functional for democracy (Whelan 1983, 17). Even more 
problematic is the fact that the attribution of participation rights 
according  to  the  degree  of  affectedness  undercuts  political 
equality  (Gould  2004,  176;  Miller  2009,  217). Moreover,  the 
problem would  simply  be  relocated  to  the  definition  of  who 
decides on the proportion of affectedness. 
Second, if  the principle can be applied to the people  actually 
affected by a decision, the decision has to be made before its 
outcome  and  who  it  affects  can  be  determined.  However,  in 
order to make a decision, the group of decision-makers has to be 
designated. So a problem of circularity arises because deciding 
who should be included in the demos is dependent on knowing 
which outcome will occur (Whelan 1983, 17; Gould 2004, 177; 
Goodin  2007,  52–53;  Cheneval  2011,  65;  Miller  2009,  215). 
This has also been understood as an indeterminacy problem due 
to  the  interaction  between  the  domain  of  the  demos  and  the 
scope of issues (Dahl 1989, 195; Miller 2009, 215–16). Owen 
(2012, 131–33) tries to disprove the inconsistency of the actual 
affected  interpretation  by  showing  that  it  cannot  only  be 
understood as  dependent  on the outcome.  Actual  affectedness 
should rather be comprehended as being affected by a choice 
9 See Owen (2012) for a convincing critique of Nozick’s (1974, 
269) dismissal of the intuitiveness of the all-affected principle.
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from a range of options, not dependent on the implementation of 
a specific option. With reference to Goodin (2007), he argues 
that the outcome understanding is  too narrow because it  only 
considers the course of action that is taken rather than the whole 
range of options and, furthermore, that this implausibly sets the 
status  quo  as  a  baseline.  I  agree  with  Owen  that  the  choice 
interpretation is more plausible.10 However, as he points out, it is 
also incapable of defining the constituency of the demos. This is 
only possible in a two-stage resolution (Owen 2012).
Third,  the  principle  can  refer  to  all  of  the  people  possibly  
affected. According to the expansive possibilist reading, all those 
possibly  affected  should  have  a  say  in  the  decision-making. 
However, this means that the demos should include all possibly 
affected in all possible worlds (Goodin 2007, 59–62; Cheneval 
2011,  66–68).  This  reading  would  mean  that  “(at  least  in 
principle) we should give virtually everyone a vote on virtually 
everything  virtually  everywhere  in  the  world”  (Goodin  2007, 
64). Clearly, this leads to an infinity problem, which is not only 
about  the  practical  possibility  of  global  elections,  but  also 
theoretically problematic since future generations also need to be 
taken  into  account  but  cannot  vote  yet  (Tännsjö  2007). 
According to the principle that ought implies can, the expansion 
of the demos to future generations is not necessary as it is simply 
impossible. Therefore, the inclusion of future generations is not 
required.  Yet,  since  a  territorial  unrestricted  demos  is 
theoretically possible this is what is demanded by the principle. 
In summary, it can therefore be concluded that the understanding 
of the all-affected principle as all possibly affected is the most 
plausible interpretation, but that it demands global inclusion.
b) All-Subjected, All-Coerced and Interlinked Interests 
Besides the discussed interpretations of the all-affected principle, 
there are three other readings of interest which further specify 
the  relevant  manner  of  being  affected.  Affected  can  be 
understood first, as  being subjected to the laws of the polity in 
question; second, as being coerced by the binding decision of the 
government; and third, as having interlinked interests at stake. I 
will argue that all of these understandings presuppose a political 
structure that includes decision-making procedures (democratic 
or not) and then call for the adaption of who has political rights.  
To  make  the  demos  more  inclusionary  does  not  answer  the 
question of how this political structure and with it the boundaries 
of  the  demos  should  be  constituted  in  the  first  place. 
Furthermore, these principles might be biased by their starting 
point.
The first understanding of being affected as  being subjected to 
the  laws  of  a  specific  polity  always  presupposes  an  already 
existing state. It is very important to discuss the distribution of 
voting rights  or the naturalisation of permanent  residents.  For 
example,  there  is  an  interesting  discussion  regarding  whether 
residence  is  a  sufficient  or  even  necessary  condition  for 
subjection  (López-Guerra  2005;  Owen  2011).  For  this 
discussion,  the  all-subjected  principle  is  indeed  crucial. 
Nevertheless, it does not give guidance on how to legitimately 
10 Nevertheless, the problem remains that one would need to 
know the set of options available, which is again dependent on 
who can participate in the decision-making. Furthermore, Owen 
argues that, only plausible options have to be considered (Owen 
2012, 133). However, it remains unclear to me how the 
plausibility of the options can be defined if it is still to be 
decided for whom the decision should be plausible.
determine  the  initial  boundaries  of  a  demos.  Rather,  it  only 
indicates  how to  correct  inclusion,  because  it  presupposes  an 
already existing polity. 
A second interpretation comes, for example, from Miller, who 
interprets relevant affectedness as being under the  coercion of 
the government. It is often argued that subjection to laws has to 
be justified to those subjected because it involves the possibility 
of coercion for their enforcement. However, in Miller’s view, it 
is  not  the use of  force per se but the fact that  coercion – as 
opposed  to  prevention,  which  might  also  be  coercive  in  its 
means  but  only  rules  out  one  particular  action  –  restricts  an 
individual  to  a  particular  course  of  action  and  therefore 
interferes  with  their  autonomy.  This  is  the  case  for  the  state 
since, in modern democracies, “the web of laws is sufficiently 
directive that virtually everyone will be intermittently subject to 
coercion”  (Miller 2009, 222). Therefore, Miller’s interpretation 
of  coercion  can  be  understood  to  apply  to  those  who  are 
permanently  subjected  to  the  binding  laws  of  a  polity.  As  a 
matter of fact the all-subjected and all-coerced principle concur 
in this interpretation.
Abizadeh (2010) has criticised Miller’s conception of coercion 
because, in his opinion, unilateral border control, which Miller 
sees  as  a  case  of  prevention,  also  coerces  potential  migrants 
outside  the  borders.  According  to  Abizadeh,  the  distinction 
between  prevention  and  coercion  does  not  suffice  since 
prevention-threats are also a form of coercion if they threaten to 
use physical force. Therefore, the relevant principle here is being 
subjected  to  coercion.  This  is  especially  important  for  state 
coercion as it involves the threat of overwhelming physical force 
(Abizadeh 2010, 126). In this understanding, a government also 
coerces  individuals  who have not  yet  entered  the  territory  of 
their state. This is not the case for other readings of the subjected 
or  coerced  principle.  Abizadeh  argues  that  potential  migrants 
who  are  hindered  from  entering  a  country  are  entitled  to  a 
democratic justification for their exclusion.11 This results in a 
critique  of  the  state  sovereignty  view  on  the  basis  of  an 
unbounded demos. Abizadeh’s understanding of affectedness as 
coercion  does  not  coincide  with  being  subjected  since  the 
coercion that a state exercises can also affect individuals outside 
of its jurisdiction. It therefore leads to the conclusion that the 
demos is generally unbounded, a concept I will discuss in detail 
in section 1d. 
These principles with the exception of Abizadeh’s understanding 
of being subjected request what I would call internal integration. 
They aim for the adaption of inclusion in the political structure 
(generally a state with a specific  territory and jurisdiction) but 
do  not  question  it more generally.  This  is  problematic  in  the 
sense  that  the  unquestioned  territorial  borders  are  both 
normatively arbitrary and often in question as they are defined 
through war and power struggles in the course of history (e.g. 
Whelan 1983, 19–24; Arrhenius 2005). Since they depend on an 
existing political structure as their starting point the all-subjected 
and the all-coerced principles are not a criterion  for the initial 
definition of the demos.  Nevertheless,  these principles can be 
understood  as  correcting  the  inclusion  of  those  who  can 
11 Miller argues that Abizadeh’s understanding of coercion does 
not always invade autonomy. In his view, prevention differs 
from coercion in the range of alternative options that are still 
available. As coercion does not leave other courses of action 
open, it always interferes with autonomy and therefore requires 
democratic justification, i.e. inclusion in the demos, whereas 
prevention only requires justification (Miller 2010).
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participate in the decision-making of an already given people, 
like Dahl’s principle of inclusion (Dahl 1989, 119). I will come 
back to this reconstitution of the demos in the third part of this 
paper.
Third, the all-affected interest principle can refer to  interlinked 
interests  (Goodin 2007, 47). This would mean that a demos is 
legitimately  constituted  by  individuals  whose  interests  are 
intertwined.  This  concept  has  also  been  called  the  “common 
world condition,” which means “that in the common world, all 
or  nearly  all  the  fundamental  interests  of  each  person  are 
implicated and so each person has roughly equal stakes in the 
shape of the common world” (Christiano 2008, 81).12 However, 
this understanding faces difficulties similar to those of the all-
subjected principle because the question still remains, how does 
this  common  world  come  about?  In  my  opinion,  political 
structures are  necessary for  its  formation.  This means that an 
already existing polity and a system of law to which individuals 
are subject would likely induce a common world, but then the 
state  is  again  presupposed,  this  time through  its  institutions. 
Another example of interlinked interests is Gould’s concept of 
“common activity.” Here, a number of individuals unite to reach 
a  given  purpose.  In  this  group,  “rights  of  democratic 
participation arise  from the rights  to  self-determination in  the 
context of common or joint activities” (Gould 2004, 175). For 
Gould, the basis for this understanding is that “people should be 
equally  free  to  control  the  conditions  of  their  own  activity,” 
which  establishes  a  right  of  participation  (Gould  2004,  175). 
This understanding of the principle does, however, not define the 
constitution  of  the  demos  but  demands  more  generally 
participatory decision-making.
Since all of the discussed versions of being affected a political 
structure,  none  of  them are  a  constitutional  principle  for  the 
demos that defines  where its borders (and with it, those of the 
state) should be drawn. They rather correct the internal political 
inclusion inside an existing polity. 
c) Voluntary Association
An  alternative  to  the  all-affected  principle  for  defining  a 
legitimate demos could be a model based on mutual recognition 
which  thus  forms  the  demos  as  a  voluntary  association.  For 
example, Whelan discusses the idea of consent as another ideal 
of democracy. However, this concept of a voluntary association 
founded through consent results  in  open and fluid boundaries 
that are unsuitable for a demos as the basis of a democratic state 
(Whelan 1983, 26). On the other hand, he draws attention to the 
problem  of  insufficient  mobility  in  the  international  realm, 
which would make it practically impossible to establish such a 
consent principle. This empirical fact cannot be ignored but, in 
my  opinion,  the  problem  of  consent  theory  lies  at  the  more 
fundamental theoretical level. 
There are  two ways  to  understand  the  creation of  the demos 
through consent:  either in only one decision or through serial 
consents. In the first case, the demos would be formed in one 
decision at one moment in which all individuals who accept each 
other constitute a people. Alternatively, some individuals would 
12 The principle could also be understood to mean that 
democratic decision-making is appropriate only in groups with 
interlinked interests. In this case it outlines a condition for 
democratic decision-making, not a constitution principle of the 
people. I will come back to this in section 3b.
agree  to  form  a  demos  and  afterwards  more  could  join  if 
accepted by all members. In the first scenario, the main problem 
is  that  it  presupposes the boundaries  of  the group which can 
actually  consent,  or  it  leads  again  to  an  infinity  problem,  as 
everyone should be able to enter the demos. Furthermore, two 
procedural paradoxes arise. The paradox of self-exclusion means 
that if person A excludes person B, B would also exclude A, and 
so both would be excluded. Therefore everyone would have to 
accept  everyone  else  in  order  to  not  be  excluded.  Another 
paradox is the exclusion of the individuals who have accepted 
all others. This seems intuitively problematic as it restricts the 
autonomy of this individual for the benefit of the others. In any 
case, an option for the excluded individuals outside of the new 
demos must be available. This is highly problematic in the case 
of political peoples who make claims for a state territory; as for 
the excluded, a non-state territory would be necessary. 
The serial option is unproblematic regarding the first  point of 
criticism  because  there  is  no  closed  group  needed  in  this 
ongoing process. Furthermore, the paradox of self-exclusion is 
not  relevant  here.  However,  the  second  paradox,  the  one 
concerning the exclusion of individuals who have accepted all 
others, is more severe. On the one hand, the newcomer has to 
accept all members if he wants to become a part of the demos 
but  only  one  disagreeing  member  is  enough  to  exclude  the 
newcomer.  So  an  even  more  drastic  inequality  is  generated 
between  the  members,  who  can  never  be  excluded  from the 
demos once they are part  of it,  and the newcomers.13 This is 
specifically  problematic  in  the  context  of  the  formation  of  a 
demos since it is a political people, not just a club. Exclusion 
from states is much more severe and must therefore be justified 
to those excluded.  The analogy of clubs and states made,  for 
example,  by  Walzer  (1983,  39–41),  ignores  this  difference 
between private and public. In the latter, equal treatment should 
prevail  over  the  freedom  of  association  (Carens  1987,  267). 
Finally, both concepts are highly problematic from a democratic 
point of view because they allow for undemocratic criteria of 
exclusion: the individuals who are already within the demos can 
exclude others on absurd grounds. Evidently, neither version of 
consent as the foundation of the demos is compatible with the 
standard of equality.
d) Unbounded Demos or the All-affected Principle as a 
Critical Standard
Even  though  Whelan  regards  a  fluid,  open  demos  as 
inappropriate for democracy, I will use this section to discuss the 
advantages  and  disadvantages  of  an  unbounded  demos.  This 
concept  is  used  in  the  theory  of  deliberation,  in  which  the 
legitimating  power  of  the  political  processes  is  highly 
determined  by  the  circumstances  of  communication  and  the 
development of decisions. Habermas distinguishes between the 
development  of  a  political  opinion  in  the  public  sphere  and 
decision-making  in  the  institutionalised  administration 
(Habermas 2001a). The task of the public consists in developing 
discursive  arguments  in  a  deliberative  process  and  thereby 
discovering and forming common interests,  needs and values. 
He claims that  in  deliberative politics,  the  ideal  procedure of 
subjectless communication is the normative ideal underpinning 
both the consultative meetings of parliamentary bodies and the 
13 In common naturalisation procedures, it is of course not the 
case that one disagreeing member is enough to deny someone 
citizenship. However, this does not dissolve the inequality 
generated between the two sides.
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communication networks of the public sphere. Accordingly, the 
subject of the legal community disappears in subjectless forms 
of  communication  (Habermas  1998,  251).  Establishing  the 
epistemic value of democratic deliberation cannot be bound to a 
delimitated citizenship; it has to allow for openness. 
Abizadeh’s  (2008)  “unbounded  demos  thesis”  applies  this 
concept generally to the ultimate reference point of democratic 
legitimacy  which  can,  in  his  opinion,  only  be  an  unbounded 
demos. Abizadeh argues that the discussion about borders is not 
to  be  understood  as  a  conflict  between  liberal  principles  of 
individual  freedom and the  democratic  principle  of  collective 
self-determination;  rather,  bounded  democratic  sovereignty, 
based on a delimitated demos,  is  incoherent.  First,  the  demos 
cannot be constituted in accordance with democratic principles 
and, second, the question of boundaries always poses a problem 
of externalities by coercing both the included and the excluded 
sides.  In  this  understanding,  the  demos  of  democracies  is 
generally  unbounded  and  therefore  boundaries  have  to  be 
justified to foreigners as well as to citizens (Abizadeh 2008, 44–
48).14 Also  according  to  Besson,  the  deterritorialisation  of 
democracy  and  the  demos  is  necessary  since  territorial 
democracies cannot solve the affected interests problem (Besson 
2006, 195). 
Nevertheless, the problem remains that an unbounded demos is 
not  a  performative  demos  because  it  cannot  act.  Democratic 
decisions are not possible as is not clear who has a say in the  
decision-making. This problem is also visible in liberal theory in 
the inherent tension between universal principles and a closed 
state.  Liberal democracy as devised by Rawls on the one hand 
aspires to a  transcending element for its universal legitimation 
and, on the other hand, presupposes a society as a closed system 
(Rawls 1971, 7, 229). Such a finite society cannot be legitimised 
by universal liberal principles. In contrast, the original position 
refers to the capability of human beings to reason and to put 
themselves into another’s position,  thus  transcending  every 
closed group. In this sense, it refers to an unbounded deliberative 
demos. It is the ability to provide reasons that makes everybody 
part  of the deliberative demos (Cheneval 2006,  162–72).  This 
deliberative  demos  is  conceptually  unbounded,  because  the 
purpose of deliberation is to discuss all reasons, not to exclude 
them,  and the ability to give reasons does not depend on the 
affectedness.  To  bring  these  two  aspects  of  liberal  theory 
together, Cheneval (2006) argues in favour of an understanding 
of the liberal demos with a dual form. “The political decision-
making and voting demos is embedded in the deliberative demos 
and  only  both  together  form  the  liberal  democratic  demos” 
(Cheneval  2006,  159–60).  According  to  Cheneval,  these  two 
concepts  of  the  demos  are  essentially  non-coextensive.  The 
unbounded demos is a deliberative ideal but it fails to constitute 
a  performative  demos.  Liberal  democracies  require  a  clearly 
defined demos for democratic decision-making. If a demos is not 
clearly  defined,  votes  and  elections  are  impossible  as  it  is 
unclear who has a vote.
The analysis of the normative principles which seek to define the 
demos  shows  that  none  of  the  discussed  principles  can  be 
understood as a constitutional principle determining a legitimate 
demos.  The  all-affected  principle  is  not  appropriate  for 
restricting a demos. It should also be noted that the all-affected 
principle does not necessarily constitute membership rights, but 
14 Abizadeh does not specify whether this justification implies a 
right to vote or merely consideration in a deliberation process.
it  might  nevertheless  determine  a  right  to  participation  in 
deliberation,  decision-making  or  compensation  for  negative 
effects (Goodin 2007, 64–68; Cheneval 2011, 68–69). However, 
the all-affected principle in its expansive possibilist reading can 
be understood as a critical ideal, questioning the legitimacy of 
all demoi and demanding more inclusion (e.g. Cheneval 2011, 
67–69). This  interpretation  of  the  all-affected  principle  as  a 
critical  principle  corresponds  to  the  concept  of  an  open 
unbounded demos. 
The discussed readings of being affected, like the all-subjected 
principle, only correct the inclusion in a presupposed polity. I 
will come back to the idea of the reconstitution of the demos in 
the third part of this paper. For the moment, it can be concluded 
that  the  normative  principles  discussed  in  this  part  can  be 
understood  as  inclusion  principles,  either  demanding  more 
internal inclusion of an existing demos or criticising it  in the 
sense  of  an  unreachable  ideal.  Given  that  a  bounded  demos 
remains  necessary  for  democratic  decision-making,  I  will 
discuss  what  the  democratic  performance  of  a  demos  is,  and 
whether it demands a specific kind of cohesion, in the next part 
of the paper.
II Democratic Function of the Demos: What Kind of 
Cohesion Is Required?
In  the  literature,  the  demos  is  not  understood  as  the  simple 
connection  of  individuals  who  happen  to  be  members  of  a 
political  community.  It  is  especially  characterised  through  a 
performative aspect, meaning the ability of democratic decision-
making. In this second part, I will discuss how the democratic 
function of the demos can be understood as a restricting criterion 
and which kind of cohesion is necessary for the demos to fulfil 
this function. I will refer to cohesion not in terms of externally 
attributed characteristics, but as a synonym for affectivity, or a 
feeling of belonging together, shared by the members. Cohesion 
can  of  course  be  motivated  by  certain  characteristics  held  in 
common by the different members. However, since cohesion as 
such and not pre-political existing attributes is regarded as the 
important aspect for a demos, different kinds of cohesion could 
be relevant in defining it.  I do not argue here that democracy 
should  rely  on  a  homogenous  and  singular  subject,  or  that  a 
heterogeneous plurality of citizens is problematic. Rather, I want 
to  explore  whether  cohesion is  in  some way required for  the 
demos and if this is of any importance to its constitution.
If the demos is characterised as a performative unit, an “agency 
based”  account  of  the  demos  is  required. List  and  König-
Archibugi (2010) have elaborated such an account with a focus 
on functional or performative characteristics. It brings together a 
‘populist’ version,  which  understands  the  demos  as  having  a 
general will, and a ‘discursive’ version, which requires internal 
cohesion with participation and interaction in a common public 
sphere. In their understanding, the function of the demos is “to 
guide collective decision making and to  facilitate  coordinated 
action”  (List  and  König-Archibugi  2010,  87).  Warren  (2006) 
considers not only decision-making but also executive processes 
as necessary for collective agency. In both cases, the demos is 
defined  as  a  collection  of  individuals  capable  of  democratic 
agency,  which  includes  an  organisational  structure,  rules  and 
procedures to make decisions and to take action in a democratic 
way. However, the account of List  and König-Archibugi does 
not equate the demos to the state, but rather conceives the demos 
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as having the capacity to be incorporated into a state-like agent  
with institutions. The underlying idea is that the nature of the 
collective itself does not create a barrier to the development of  
such institutional structures. 
List  and  König-Achibugi  make  two  suggestions  for  the 
identifying  characteristics  of  this  kind  of  collective:  first, 
external  cohesion as  the ability  to  support  collective  decision 
and,  second,  internal  cohesion  as  the  ability  to  endorse  its 
collective  decisions.  External  cohesion  is,  in  this  view,  a 
coherent collective attitude defined by a democratic criterion as 
majority (List and König-Archibugi 2010, 94). Internal cohesion 
is distinguished further in substantive agreement on fundamental 
matters  and  meta-agreements  on  how  to  conceptualise 
substantially  controversial  issues  (List  and  König-Archibugi 
2010,  95–97).  However,  this  capacity  of  democratic  agency 
seems difficult  to  evaluate  if  organisational  structures  are  left 
out,  especially  since the emergence of  a  feeling of  belonging 
together  and  democratic  values  interact  with  institutions.  List 
and König-Archibugi recognise that deliberation, civic education 
and  political  socialisation  promote  cohesion  (List  and  König-
Archibugi 2010, 103), but their approach remains problematic in 
that the demos as a democratic agent can be separated from its 
institutions.  I do, however, agree with their assessment that the 
performance of a demos is evaluated by its democratic agency. 
As  List  and  König-Archibugi  suggest,  external  and  internal 
cohesion  are  determinative.  Therefore,  the  question  arises 
whether the demos can – and should – be defined by cohesion 
and, if so, what kind of cohesion should be relevant. 
In  the  discussion about  cohesion  binding the  demos together, 
two  predominant  strains  of  theory  have  evolved  in  the  last 
twenty years: liberal nationalism and political patriotism. Both 
see a certain kind of cohesion of members as a necessary basis 
for the functioning of democracies. Yet, the understanding of this 
cohesion  is  profoundly  different.  Liberal  nationalism 
understands the unity of the demos as grounded in a shared pre-
political national culture (Kymlicka 1995; Miller 1995) whereas 
constitutional  patriotism  dismisses  the  idea  of  a  pre-political 
basis and refers to a shared commitment to liberal-democratic 
principles embodied in the constitution (Müller 2007; Shabani 
2006;  Habermas  2001b).  In  the  national  account,  national 
identity  is  conceived  as  being  important  to  individuals  and 
worthy  of  political  protection.  The  understanding  of 
constitutional patriotism, on the other hand, does not argue for 
the protection of a national  identity  but  only for  fundamental 
political principles. This means that exclusion has to be justified 
by general principles of democracy or public order rather than 
on the basis of culture. Furthermore, nationalist theories consider 
the  nation-state  to  be  the  best-suited  unit  to  provide  certain 
important  liberal  goods,  such  as  distributive  justice  and 
deliberation. 
In order to determine which kind of cohesion is the relevant one 
for  the  demos,  I  will  discuss  the  concepts  of  a)  national  or 
cultural cohesion, b) cohesion as solidarity and c) constitutional 
patriotism or political cohesion as the ties which bind the demos 
together.  Under  national  cohesion,  I  will  mainly  address  the 
general national understanding of the demos and not specifically 
its liberal  version.  This is because the pre-political  foundation 
remains the same and, even though liberal nationalism reduces 
illiberal tendencies, the exclusion is still based on the idea of a 
pre-political nation. 
a) National or Cultural Cohesion
In national theories, some kind of collective identity is regarded 
as  a  precondition  for  a  legitimate  democratic  polity.  This 
collective can be understood as being determined by the shared 
characteristics of  the  members.  According  to  Whelan,  the 
nationalist understanding starts from nations15 as given by nature 
or by history, which then give rise to the claim of independent 
statehood and self-government  (Whelan 1983,  28–29). In  this 
theory,  the relation between ethnos  and  demos  or  nation  and 
state leads unidirectionally from one to the other.16 The ethnos is 
understood  as  a  pre-political  unit,  defined  in  racial,  ethnic, 
cultural or religious terms.17 In contrast, the demos, as political 
subject, consists of its citizens, meaning it is the political people 
of a polity. As early as in Aristotle’s Politics, the demos refers to 
the  citizens,  who  are  defined  through  active  participation  in 
governing (Aristotle 1985, 87 1275a20). In the following, I will 
discuss whether the definition of the demos according to a pre-
political  nation  gives  theoretical  guidance  for  the  legitimate 
constitution  of  the  demos  and  whether  it  fulfils  liberal-
democratic criteria.
Several authors have argued for the necessity of nations as the 
basis  of  democracies.  For  example,  Mill  states:  “Where  the 
sentiment  of  nationality  exists  in  any  force,  there  is  a  prima 
facie case for uniting all the members of the nationality under 
the same government,  and a  government  to  themselves apart. 
This is merely to say that the question of government ought to 
be  decided  by  the  governed”  (Mill  1861,  230). Carl  Schmitt 
makes an even stronger claim by identifying a “homogeneous” 
people,  sharing  a  culture  and  identity,  as  a  presumption  for 
democracy  (Schmitt  1926,  14).  Taking  this  question  to  the 
transnational  level,  Dieter  Grimm  argues  that  Europe-wide 
democracy can only be acceptable with a homogenous European 
people as a basis (Grimm 1995, 295–96).18 In this understanding, 
cohesion is defined in pre-political terms, which then builds the 
basis for the political unit appropriate for democracy. However, 
as Whelan points out, the interpretation of nationalism on the 
grounds of democratic theory  – which Mill implies by saying 
that  government  should  be  decided by  the governed –  is  not 
coherent  (Whelan  1983,  29).  Either  the  definition  is  circular, 
since who is governed has to be decided before they can decide 
democratically, or the nation offers a solution for how to set the 
borders,  but  then  this  is  not  a  democratic  solution  to  the 
boundary problem. In this version, democracy is restricted to the 
domain  of  a  given  people,  which  itself  is  not  constituted 
democratically (Whelan 1983, 31).
Another theoretical problem of nationalist  theory that Whelan 
points out is its claim that nations are prior to and independent 
of states. National identities are often deliberately invented and 
15 In the following, “nation” is used to specify a group with a 
common cultural identity, not necessarily the people of a nation-
state.
16 For a more detailed taxonomy of the logic and the scope of 
identity-formation, see Cederman (2001). I refer to the two 
understandings of national and political cohesion relatively 
broadly in the way Cederman (2001) defines “ethno-
nationalism” and “post-nationalism.”
17 Miller tries to distinguish nationality from both ethnicity and 
the state (Miller 1988, 656–58). For me, however, the normative 
significance of nationality seems to be based on one of the two. 
The collapse into a pre-political basis of legitimation is highly 
problematic (cf. Abizadeh 2012).
18 However, Grimm dissociates himself from Schmitt’s 
understanding of a people and understands it in social terms. For 
a specific discussion, see Habermas (1998, 155–61).
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promoted by political leaders (Whelan 1983, 33). In this sense, 
nationality is not naturally given and pre-political but socially 
and  politically  constructed,  and  therefore  cannot  give  prior 
guidance for the boundaries of political communities. A nation is 
not a static entity as it is always related to political processes. 
Even if a constitution of the demos on the basis of naturally and 
historically given national units using criteria such as language, 
cultural practice or shared memories were possible, it would be 
highly  problematic  as  it  leads  to  the  political  protection  of 
national identities and therefore to the exclusion of others for 
reasons that are not defendable on the grounds of equality. This 
means that exclusion is made on politically arbitrary grounds. 
The constitution  of  the  people  in  accordance with  an already 
existing nation is therefore illegitimate. 
b) Cohesion as Solidarity
Even  if  the  ethno-cultural  concept  of  the  nation  cannot  give 
guidance for the legitimate boundaries of the demos, it points to 
something  necessary  for  democracy,  which  is  cohesion  as 
solidarity. The concept of social cohesion or solidarity is crucial 
for  democracy  if  it  is  meant  to  guarantee  social  justice  and 
deliberation. A feeling of common belonging is conducive to the 
democratic  process:  on  the  one  hand  for  deliberation,  which 
includes listening to others’ arguments and taking their position 
seriously, and, on the other hand, for the acceptance of decisions 
one  did  not  support  (loser  consent)  and  decisions  which 
advantage  others  (redistribution).  This  is  where liberal 
nationalism has  a  strong  point.  The  basic  idea  of  liberal 
nationalism is to realise the interest in collective identity but also 
to provide trust, stability and reciprocity, which are necessary in 
democratic  politics  (Miller  1995;  Kymlicka  1995).  The  point 
Mill makes about nationality as a feeling of belonging together 
seems  to  be  more  directed  at  these  favorable  conditions  of 
democracy than at a given identity as a precondition. "Among a 
people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak 
different languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the 
working of representative government, cannot exist” (Mill 1861, 
230).  So  a  certain  amount  of  solidarity  is  necessary  for  the 
democratic process.
However,  it  is  not necessary that the cohesion connecting the 
demos  is  pre-political.  It  could  also  be  realised  through  a 
solidarity that is generated in social networks. Shared interests,  
interpersonal networks or other forms of integration also have to 
be recognised as sources of solidarity, indicating that identities 
can emerge even across borders. If cohesion is not understood as 
a  national  identity  based  on  a  fixed  set  of  commonalities  or 
shared history, but rather as solidarity, the question arises of how 
it  is  created.  As  Calhoun (2003)  points  out,  social  solidarity, 
which  creates  a  group  identity,  can  be  formed  on  multiple 
grounds: first, by forms of integration like markets; second, by a 
shared culture and categorical identities like race, ethnicity, class 
or nation; and third, by networks through interpersonal relations. 
He  also  underlines  the  importance  of  public  discourse  as  a 
source of social  solidarity.  “Groups are created not just  found 
and  the  forms  of  group  life  are  at  least  potentially  open  to 
choice”  (Calhoun 2003,  98).  This  means  that  institutions  and 
processes such as public discourse can influence solidarity and 
therefore identity formation in a group.  This understanding of 
identity as solidarity addresses democracy’s need for cooperation 
that is not based on an illusory, fixed and pre-political concept of 
identity. 
This  also  applies  for  the  solidarity  necessary  for  the  demos, 
which can develop within institutions. For example, Archibugi 
states: “To think that the demos is independent from institutions 
is equal to thinking that the  demos could ever be independent 
from  history”  (Archibugi  2004,  461).  He  also  suggests  an 
understanding  of  solidarity  which  is  not  primarily  based  on 
political terms. He claims that solidarity can extend beyond the 
borders of nation-states. He sees an expression of a “feeling of 
belonging  to  the  planet”  in  the  ongoing  creation  of  non-
governmental  organisations and global  movements  (Archibugi 
2004). Solidarity can create groups across borders according to 
communalities and interests. 
For Habermas (1998),  who has analysed the relation between 
nation and state in detail, the nation-state, which dominates the 
actual political landscape, combines an imaginary cultural nation 
and political citizenship. While the state as internal and external  
sovereign state power, referring to a clearly delimited territory 
and  to  all  citizens,  was  used  to  define  the  citizens  only  as 
subordinate  to  the  political  system,  the  nation  referred  to  a 
community connected through common ancestry.  Through the 
combination  of  both  nation  and  state,  a  new  double  role  of 
citizenship  with  a  political-legal  and  cultural  aspect  resulted. 
“Democratic  participation,  as  it  slowly  became  established, 
generated  a  new level  of  legally  mediated  solidarity via  the 
status  of  citizenship  while  providing  the  state  with  a  secular 
source  of  legitimation” (Habermas  1998,  112).  This  political 
transformation,  which  enables  political  autonomy  through  an 
order  legitimated  in  free  opinion-formation,  would  not  have 
been strong enough without the motivating force of the idea of 
the nation. So the nation-state on the one hand includes a natural 
pre-political unit which is allowed to defend its independence by 
force or, on the other hand, is based, in legal terms, on the status 
of citizen,  which leads to public autonomy in a cosmopolitan 
understanding,  compatible  with  cooperation  with  others 
(Habermas 1998, 114). A political understanding of the demos is 
only based on the latter. However, Calhoun objects to this view 
saying  that  it  is  unlikely  that  solidarity  is  purely a  matter  of 
choice and that the nation of citizens can replace the cultural 
nation,  as  Habermas  suggests.  In  his  opinion,  the  political 
concept  of  the  person  has  two  weaknesses:  first,  solidarity 
outside of political structures is underestimated and, second, it 
requires too much participation (Calhoun 2003, 100). In order to 
consider  these  problems  and  the  responses  to  them,  I  will 
discuss the political concept of cohesion in more detail in the 
next section.
c) Constitutional Patriotism or Political Cohesion
As  addressed  above,  different  authors  claim  that  cohesion, 
understood as  a  fluid rather  than a  fixed concept,  might  also 
result from interaction with political structures. The concept of 
political  cohesion  tries  to  preserve  the  stabilising  forces  of 
cohesion which are necessary for democracy, but builds them on 
the  basis  of  the  equal  recognition  of  shared  citizenship. 
Constitutional patriotism shares this interactive understanding of 
the demos.  According to Cronin, it is a “postnational form of 
political  identification and attachment for pluralistic societies” 
(2003, 3). This identification evolves around the norms, values 
and  procedures  of  liberal  democracy.  In  the  idea  of 
constitutional  patriotism  as  outlined  by  Habermas  and  others 
(Habermas 1998; Habermas 2001b; Cronin 2003; Müller 2007), 
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the cohesion of the demos relies on a shared sense of democratic 
values, which are represented in the constitution, rather than on a 
common history or ethnic origin.
In such a political understanding of the demos, it is possible to 
decouple  nationality  and  membership  in  the  demos  as 
membership is based on the acceptance of the rights and duties 
of citizenship (e.g. Weiler, Haltern, and Mayer 1995). The theory 
of  constitutional  patriotism  puts  a  specific  emphasis  on  the 
relationship of citizens institutionalised in the constitution. This 
is  clearly  outlined  in  Utzinger’s  concept  of  political  identity, 
which he defines as a specific kind of social collective identity  
that develops within the framework of social institutions with a 
politically  relevant  function  (Utzinger  2009,  126).  By 
establishing stable norms and roles, institutions define what sort 
of behaviour can be expected from other members of society. 
Political  institutions  are  public  bodies  determined  to  regulate 
certain  activities  which  apply  to  the  whole  population. 
According  to  Utzinger,  it  is  citizenship  that  is  the  basis  for 
identification  through  three  dimensions:  functionally, it 
designates  full  membership  in  a  society;  substantively, it  is  a 
legal  status;  and  affectively, it  establishes  a  relation  between 
individual and state, so that a feeling of belonging to the polity 
develops (Utzinger 2009, 151). Above all, citizenship plays the 
dominant role  in political  identification,  since identification is 
functional  and  citizenship  guarantees  access  to  fundamental 
resources such as security, autonomy and recognition (Utzinger 
2009, 158). 
Generally,  constitutional  patriotism  describes  governmental 
institutions  and  the  cohesion  of  the  demos  as  mutually 
reproductive as opposed to the fixed units of national theories. 
This seems to be a more accurate understanding of the actual  
relationship  between  political  institutions  and  the  demos. 
Another theoretical advantage of the political conception of the 
demos is that the politically protected cohesion is not a cultural  
one. This means that the potential exclusionary effects are not in 
violation of political equality as they are based on democratic 
political requirements. Furthermore, the conception of political 
cohesion is not only applicable to multicultural states, but also to 
the supranational level (Habermas 1998; Shabani 2006; Müller 
2007; Lacroix 2009). 
However, constitutional patriotism has been criticised for several 
reasons. First, it has been described as too thin and too abstract  
of a conception to be accessible for normal citizens and to create 
any kind of affection. Therefore, it always has to rely on a pre-
political  nation  (Böckenförde  1991).  Second,  the  reference  to 
universal  principles  does  not  explain  a  binding  force  towards 
specific constitutions or states. Finally, the conception has been 
accused  of  being  even  more  exclusionary  than  national 
liberalism because its high degree of abstraction might lead to an 
elitist effect.
To  the  first  point,  Müller  (2007) replies  that  Habermas’ 
description of constitutional patriotism as post-national should 
be better  understood  as  post-nationalistic  because the cultural 
background  of  traditions  is  not  neglected  but  transformed 
(Cronin 2003). According to Habermas, democracy and human 
rights have to be acquired against the background of a specific 
history and culture. Yet – and this is relevant for the second point 
– in  this conception,  traditions are  subject to  a critical  public 
discussion. It enables the citizens to criticise their institutions, 
since these never perfectly match the constitutional principles. 
Furthermore,  this  constitutional  culture  is  restricted  to  the 
political realm. Regarding the third point, the exclusiveness of 
constitutional patriotism, Müller argues that this does not create 
a hostile us-them-opposition but establishes an internal reference 
point for a specific way of treating each other, which refers to 
political  values (Müller 2007,  48).  In this sense,  it  is  not  the 
source of strong social solidarity, but of civic cohesion which 
denotes political trust among citizens and is therefore stabilising. 
However,  as  Müller  also  points  out,  since  constitutional 
patriotism is always based on an existing polity, it cannot define 
territorial borders. 
In summary, neither the national nor the political understanding 
of cohesion can be used as a normative criterion to legitimately 
determine the borders of the demos. The latter is dependent on 
an  existing  polity  with  a  constitution  and  therefore  is  not  a 
theory to determine membership borders. The former is based on 
a fixed, pre-politically given identity, which leads to the illiberal  
exclusion of foreigners as unequals. Or, as Abizadeh (2012) puts 
it,  cultural  nationalism  necessarily  collapses  into  ethnic 
nationalism. However, as the democratic function of the demos 
requires  some  cohesion,  this  necessary  cohesion  can  be 
understood  as  an  exclusion  principle  for  the  demos, 
counteracting the inclusive tendency of the normative principles. 
Yet,  because the legitimacy of this restriction is based on the 
democratic  function  of  the  demos,  only  a  minimal  political 
cohesion, not a thick cultural one, can be defended. As outlined 
above, political cohesion always presupposes an existing polity. 
Therefore, political cohesion as a restriction principle cannot be 
a  constitutional  principle  but  is  only  applicable  to  existing 
demoi. 
III Procedural Reconstitution of the Demos
As has been shown in the first and second parts of this paper, it 
is not possible to initially constitute the demos in a legitimate 
way. Thus, the reconstitution of a presupposed demos remains 
the  only  option  for  a  normative  substantive  concept  of  the 
demos.  I  will  hence use this part  to discuss the possibility of 
reconstituting an already existing demos in a legitimate way. To 
start from a given demos should here not mean giving up the 
normative demands regarding the demos. This “turn to history,” 
as Näsström calls it, “does not seem to make the demands for 
legitimacy  fade  away,  and  particularly  not  today”  (Näsström 
2007, 633). 
In the first  section,  I  will  outline the concept of a procedural 
demos  (cf.  Espejo  2011;  Michelman  1999a;  Habermas  1996; 
Hart 1994). In this understanding, the demos is not constituted in 
a  single  act,  rather  it  has  to  be  continually  developed  in  the 
democratic  process.  This  means  that  the  demos  is  not  a 
substantial  singularity  based  on  pre-political  grounds.  But 
according to which criteria or principles should the demos be 
reconstituted?  In  the  second  section,  I  will  suggest  the  all-
affected principle and the democratic functionality as the two 
guiding principles for the legitimate composition of the demos. 
Nevertheless,  these two tendencies of inclusion and exclusion 
can only be balanced in the democratic process. 
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a) Procedural Understanding of the Demos
The question of how or under which circumstances the demos 
gains its legitimacy is taken up by a procedural understanding of 
the  demos.  Here,  the  sovereignty  of  a  people  refers  to  the 
democratic self-legislation process, not to a given people. Since 
this concept draws heavily on the legal constitution, it has been 
elaborated in constitutional theory by law scholars (Michelman 
1999b; Michelman 1999a; Michelman 1988; Hart 1994). As Hart 
(1994) puts it, normatively the demos conceived as the sovereign 
political authority is, at first, based on a constitutional rule. This 
rule  is  constructed  and re-enacted via  the political  and social 
processes which it initiates. Since this account puts the emphasis 
on  the  recurrent  character  of  the  people  through  democratic 
procedures, it can resolve the problem of the initial constitution 
of  the  demos,  as  Espejo  (2011,  170–95  ) has  most  clearly 
outlined.
This  conception  is  reflected  in  Michelman  (1999b)  and 
Habermas’ (2001b) understanding of  constitutional  democracy 
as  paradoxical.  On  the  one  hand,  the  constitution  fixes  the 
fundamental  laws  and,  in  turn,  the  rights  of  political 
participation. On the other hand, it is also important that these 
rights  can  be  changed  and  re-interpreted.  Therefore,  it  is  the 
ongoing process  and not  the people’s agreement to  the actual 
text at its initiation that is essential. The people should then be 
understood as having a recurrent and not a fixed character. For 
Habermas, the sovereignty of the people emerges in the process 
of self-legislation through the mutual recognition of the citizens 
as free and equal in the system of rights. The legitimating force 
is based on the communication and agreement of all members. In 
Habermas’ account, this does not rely on an actual agreement but 
a hypothetical one. Human rights and the democratic process are 
“co-originally” founded in communicative reason and therefore 
the  account  avoids  falling  into  constitutional  paternalism 
(Habermas 1996).19 The highest authority of legislation by the 
people  is  based on a  legal  rule  and on the process  of  its  re-
enactment. In this sense, the people is at first a hypothesis and its 
sovereignty is only constituted over the democratic process (Hart 
1994, 50–74).
In this conception of dynamic constitutionalism, the demos as a 
democratic  agent  can  only  exist  if  it  has  a  constitution  that 
specifies who makes up the demos, how the political process is 
organised  and  what  political  participation  entails.  Espejo, 
however,  criticises  the  concept  of  dynamic  constitutionalism 
because it refers back to a unified people either in the past or the 
future (2011, 99). She defines a people as “an unfolding series of 
events coordinated by the practices of constituting,  governing, 
and  changing  a  set  of  institutions”  (Espejo  2011,  172).  This 
means that a people has no unified will, but is a series of events. 
In this procedural understanding as well,  however,  there is no 
defined group that can initially enact the constitution in the name 
of the people. In regards to the procedural conception, Espejo 
argues that this is not a problem because if we understand the 
people as constituted by political events and not as a collection 
of  individuals,  it  can  create  and  rule  itself.  In  terms  of  the 
normative aspect of who should be included, however, Espejo 
admits  that  the  people  as  a  process  is  first  and  foremost  a 
19 For the democratic process, some basic conditions of 
communication seem to be necessary too. But this does not mean 
that the demos has to be restricted to a single language, as the 
democratic functionality of Switzerland shows. However, in a 
dispersed public sphere, the different language groups still need 
to be connected and mutually accessible. 
descriptive  concept.  Nevertheless,  she  argues  that  it  "can  be 
legitimised from the standpoint of the future" (2011, 176) since 
the  criterion of  exclusion  can be  adapted  over  time.  But  this 
procedural understanding relativizes the normative standing of 
the people: a sovereign people is not by definition right. In my 
opinion, this captures the dependence of the legitimacy of the 
demos on a  guarantee of  freedom and equality  through basic 
right.  This  means  that  for  the  demos  to  be  a  genuinely 
democratic  agent,  it  needs  to  constitute  itself  over  and  over 
again. I will discuss which criteria might be relevant to define 
such a procedural demos as legitimate in the next section.
b) Criteria for the Reconstitution
Goodin critically considers the option of the democratisation or 
“bootstrapping”  of  a  presupposed  demos  (2007,  44–46).  He 
argues  that  if  the  democratic  process  itself  reconstitutes  the 
demos,  it  does  not  matter  with  which  demos  we  start. 
Furthermore, he questions whether the democratic process itself 
leads to the legitimate demos in any case. For example, a demos 
of  men would not  necessarily  extend membership to  women. 
This  is  right  in  that  there  are  no  pre-political  grounds  from 
which to judge the composition of the demos.  Goodin argues 
that it is not possible to know whether the demos is reconstituted 
in the right way if it is not clear how to constitute the demos in  
the first place. In his opinion, it is therefore unclear whether the 
inclusionary  tendency  should  be  judged  as  an  improvement. 
There would have to be independent normative reasons to assess 
the reconstitution of the demos but, for him, this leads back to 
the problem of constituting the demos in the first place, as the 
ultimate references are the democratic decisions of the demos 
itself. 
I agree with Goodin that understanding the demos as a process 
does not in itself solve the problem of its normativity. This holds 
for the procedural understanding of the demos as well because it 
remains  important  who  can  participate  in  the  events  that 
constitute  the  people. I  would  therefore  argue  that  the  initial 
demos can never  be legitimate.  Owen argues that  at  the first 
stage of solving the boundary problem the interlinked interest 
principle  defines  a  pre-political  demos “that  has  the  right  to 
determine  whether  to  constitute  a  structure  of  impartial 
governance  and,  if  so,  what  kind  of  structure  of  impartial 
governance whether,  say,  to  constitute  a  polity” (Owen 2012, 
143).  In  the  second  state  only  those  who  consent  become 
members of the political demos. As I have discussed in section 
1b,  the  interlinked  principle  can  however  not  legitimate  the 
constitution of an initial demos because the interlinked interests 
are in my opinion depend on a political structure. Rather,  the 
fact that no initial demos is legitimate should not be understood 
as democratically problematic.
For the legitimacy of the demos, it does not make a difference 
where we start, but rather how the process evolves. There also 
cannot  be  a  criterion  by  means  of  which  to  judge  the  initial 
demos.  Näsström,  however,  draws  attention  to  the  difference 
between  democratic  and  historical  contingency.  She  indicates 
that while a fully legitimate demos is impossible to achieve, the 
gap  opened  up  by  the  boundary  problem  is  of  democratic 
significance as it turns the legitimate constitution of the demos 
into an issue of ongoing contestation. Näsström states that the 
“constitution  of  the  people  is  not  a  historic  event.  It  is  an 
ongoing claim that we make” (Näsström 2007, 645). 
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Yet,  can  the  process  be  judged  by  any  standards?  If  one 
understands democracy not just as a process for decision making 
but also as an ideal defined through underlying normative values 
(e.g.  Miller  2009;  Christiano  2008),  democracy  cannot  be 
reduced to  its procedures. It  seems plausible to think of these 
democratic  ideals  as  freedom and  equality.  Christiano  (2008) 
calls  this  public  equality  and  Miller  (2009)  understands  such 
independent criteria as founded in the democratic ideal of equal 
participation. On this basis, one can argue that the demos can be 
criticised and justified on the basis of these ideals. Espejo argues 
that  there  are  no  independent  normative  standards,  but  that 
equality  and  freedom  are  always  dependent  on  individual 
experiences  in  the  democratic  process  (2011,  188).  In  my 
opinion,  these standards are  not independent  of democracy as 
they define democracy; however, they cannot be justified by or 
reduced to the democratic procedure.  To put it differently,  the 
value  of  equal  individual  freedom  holds  independent  of  its 
acceptance in a majority vote.  These “independent” ideals are 
crucial  because  without  them there  is  no way of  judging the 
demos and it collapses into a purely descriptive term.  But one 
has to keep in mind that this is not possible for the legitimation 
of the initial demos, but for its reconstitution. 
Miller  distinguishes  two  normative  tendencies,  inclusion  and 
exclusion, relevant for the constitution of the people. In Miller’s 
opinion,  the  problem  with  the  question  of  the  domain  of 
democracy  or  the  legitimacy of  the demos is  that  democratic 
theory  gives  ambivalent  answers.  On  the  one  hand,  radical 
democracy, which focuses on collective self-determination and 
on  the  cohesion  of  the  demos,  is  drawn  to  an  exclusionary 
tendency.  On the other  hand,  liberal  democracy,  in which the 
outcome is  evaluated  based  on  its  impact  on  individuals  and 
groups  in-  and  outside  of  its  constituency,  is  drawn  to  an 
inclusionary tendency. Both schools, however, face inclusionary 
and exclusionary pressures (Miller, 2009). 
Following the analysis of the first two parts of this paper, these 
tendencies  can  be  understood  as  the  normative  pressure  of 
inclusion due to the all-affected principle as the critical standard, 
and the pressure of exclusion based on the functionality of the 
demos. I agree with Miller’s point that democracy – and with it,  
the demos – is not just a procedure but is based on a normative 
ideal.  I  consider  equal  freedom  to  be  the  guiding  ideal  of 
democracy, which translates exactly into these two tendencies. 
These tendencies can therefore be understood as criteria for the 
reconstitution of the demos. However, Miller leaves the question 
of  how  these  criteria  should  be  weighed  against  each  other 
unanswered.
In  order  to  know  how  these  conflicting  pressures  should  be 
balanced, it is crucial to discuss which normative value should 
be assigned to them. First, as was shown in the first part of this 
paper,  the  all-affected  principle  cannot  define  the  initial 
boundaries  of  a  legitimate  demos.  As  Abizadeh  (2012,  874) 
points  out,  democratic  theory  is  a  self-referential  theory  of 
legitimacy  which  combines  the  questions  of  legitimacy  and 
boundaries.  Therefore,  the  demos  must  be  specified  for  the 
function of democracy but it is inherently unbounded.20 The all-
affected  principle  and  the  thesis  that  the  demos  is  generally 
unbounded are equivalent to what I have called the principle of 
20 According to Abizadeh (2012), the unbounded demos thesis 
has two consequences: First, global democratic arrangements are 
desirable and, second, the legitimacy of boundaries relies 
ultimately on their justification to members and non-members.
inclusion.  It  should be regarded as  the main criterion for  the 
critical  evaluation  of  the  legitimacy  of  the  demos  in  its 
reconstitution.  This  inclusionary  principle  demands  both 
internally  and  externally  expanded  inclusion  in  the  demos. 
Internal inclusion means giving participation rights to all adults 
living permanently in the territory of a state. External inclusion 
means the protection of all individual interests that are affected 
by the decisions of the demos whose consequences reach beyond 
the state. 
On the one hand, since we are now discussing the re-constitution 
of  the  demos  and  not  its  initial  foundation,  the  all-subjected 
principle can be applied without internal contradiction because 
we can presuppose a jurisdiction. This means that all subjected 
to the jurisdiction of a polity should be included in its demos.21 A 
strong claim can be made for this internal inclusion. In this case 
inclusion  must,  therefore,  be  granted  through  equal  rights  in 
democratic decision-making,  not just  through consideration.  If 
this is not the case, the demos can be deemed illegitimate. On 
the other hand, because the process of legitimation starts from a 
specific demos, the inclusion principle on its more general level 
as a critical standard against which to question every demos still 
has to be considered in the democratic process. In other words, 
because democratic theory accepts that there is no pre-political 
foundation of the demos, it has to take into account everyone’s 
claim to be included. As Goodin remarks, any given decision is 
highly likely to affect the interests of some who are not included 
in  the  demos,  especially  considering  the  increasing 
interconnection of territorial units (2007, 62–63). Consequently, 
this leads to the interpretation of the all-affected principle as a 
critical standard demanding the extension or opening up of any 
demos.  In  this  sense,  the  all-affected  principle  should  be 
understood as guidance for the critical reconstitution and for the 
extension  of  inclusion  in  either  participation  or  deliberation 
rights. This does not mean that this standard can ever be fully 
met, however it can be approximated by adapting the issues that 
are  decided  on  (scope  of  decision-making)  and  the  deciding 
demos (domain of inclusion) to each other.22 Miller (2009) only 
accepts the request for internal inclusion but rejects the second 
more general understanding of the all-affected principle in order 
to  preserve  independent  demoi.  However,  this  is  problematic 
because it gives up the critical perspective on the demos that is  
necessary for its reconstitution. Instead, he bases it on a form of 
nationalism that is not defendable, as I have set out in the second 
part.
Second, as discussed in the second part, the functionality of the 
demos to take democratic decisions and the necessary cohesion 
for  this  ability  can  be  understood  as  an  exclusion  principle. 
Here, cohesion is understood as an instrumental value necessary 
for  the  democratic  performance  of  the  demos.  However,  two 
constraints  apply  to  this  exclusion  principle  in  regards  to  its 
normative  importance.  First,  because  it  is  an  instrumental 
concern, it should only be used to restrict inclusion in the demos 
if  the  possibility  for  everyone  to  exercise  democratic 
participation is threatened. Or, like Carens (1987, 259) following 
Rawls (1971, 212-13) puts it,  such a public security argument 
should  be  used  exclusively  to  restrict  liberty  for  the  sake  of 
21 What this means in detail has to be elaborated further but it 
surely includes long-term residents.
22 This adaptation could mean on the one hand, that the 
decision should be limited so that it only affects those who 
participate in the decision-making or, on the other hand, that the 
demos has to be extended if an issue regularly affects people 
who are not included.
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liberty. Second, a fixed ethno-cultural basis of cohesion remains 
incompatible  with  political  equality.  Therefore,  only  a  thin 
political understanding of cohesion can serve as the basis for the 
legitimate delimitation of the demos. The general claim of the 
all-affected principle  can only be rejected if  it  is  a  clear  and 
immediate threat to the democratic function of the demos, and 
only on the basis of political cohesion. 
A further restriction that counteracts the principle of inclusion is 
what I have discussed under interlinked interests or what others 
have called “equal stakes” or “common world” (e.g. Christiano 
2006,  86).  It  states  that  the  appropriateness  of  democratic 
decision-making is dependent on a common set of interests. If 
the way in which a demos affects outsiders is restricted to one 
specific issue, it might be enough to include the affected in the 
decision-making  concerning  this  issue  and  not  for  the  whole 
range of democratic decisions. The full inclusion of the affected 
in the demos would actually violate the rights of the members of 
the demos because they would then be subject to the decisions of 
others who are not affected by most of the decisions. In general,  
external inclusion could also be fulfilled through other forms of 
consideration than equal voting rights (e.g. Miller 2009, 223–24; 
2011, 137–39). 
However, the hard case that has to be considered is the border 
regime. Is the restriction of closed borders touching on enough 
issues in  the lives  of  the excluded to make it  a  case for  full 
democratic  inclusion?  This  is  a  difficult  decision  to  make 
because closed borders are not only coercive but also profoundly 
influence the lives of the excluded on a wide set of issues. On 
the other hand, the absolute dissolving of borders would not lead 
to  a  functional  demoi.  Therefore,  the  implications  of  the 
inclusion principle are not as strong as in the internal case but 
are more demanding then the external case that concerns just one 
issue.  The  solution  might  be  either  open  borders  in  terms  of 
migration and then political inclusion for long-term residents, or 
the formation of impartial institutions on the international level. 
A global democracy, however, is not necessarily required, first of 
all  because  it  would  likely  be  problematic  to  the  democratic 
functionality of the demos in terms of citizen participation and, 
secondly, because forcing democratic states into such a structure 
would  violate  the  political  autonomy  of  their  individual 
members and jeopardise the only democratic institutions that we 
have. 23
Conclusion
Democracy  as  a  decision-making  procedure  needs  a  clearly 
defined  demos  but,  as  has  been  shown,  it  is  not  possible  to 
initially constitute the demos in a legitimate way. On the one 
hand, all normative principles discussed are either based on an 
already existing demos or lead to an infinity problem and are 
better understood as a critical standard for the demos’ legitimacy. 
On  the  other  hand,  cohesion  as  a  means  of  determining  the 
demos is only applicable as an exclusion criterion in the sense of 
political cohesion, which is directed at democratic functionality. 
So, the reconstitution of a presupposed demos remains the only 
option for a normative substantive concept of the demos. 
23 For arguments for and against a global democratic structure 
on the basis of the legitimacy of the demos, see Abizadeh (2012) 
and Christiano (2006).
This leads to the conclusion that the legitimation of the demos is 
only possible in the democratic process itself. This means that 
the  legitimacy  of  the  demos  has  to  be  critically  revised  and 
discussed over and over again. The two principles of inclusion 
and  exclusion  can  be  understood  as  independent  normative 
standards of equality and freedom, but can of course only be 
applied in the democratic process itself.  There, the principle of 
inclusion  should  to  be  given  first  priority.  It  should  only  be 
restricted  through  reasons  of  democratic  functionality,  which 
should  only  rely  on  political  and  not  cultural  cohesion. This 
means that the self-constitutional process by which the demos 
constitutes itself  constantly has to include both  principles and 
weigh them against each other. In this sense, a demos is never 
fully legitimate but, in the best case, striving for legitimacy.
In  consequence,  the  people  is  not  necessarily  right  in  its 
decisions,  not  under  all  circumstances,  and  especially  not  in 
regards  to  decisions  over  the  exclusion  of  others.  It  is 
particularly limited through human rights and externalities of the 
decision.  However,  even if  we evaluate  the legitimacy of  the 
demos from the ideal of equal freedom for external inclusion, its 
decisions should still be accepted. What is important is that the 
understanding  of  the  people  as  a  process  and the  all-affected 
principle are taken into account in the democratic process itself.  
Essentially, the demos has to be aware that its legitimacy is not 
absolute.  This  leads  to  a  new  understanding  of  self-
determination which is not a unilateral right. 
The result seems to be an inconsistency or even contradiction in 
democratic theory since the legitimacy of democratic decisions 
is based on the demos while the demos itself has to be constantly 
legitimised  through  the  democratic  process.  However,  this 
restriction  of  the  normative  status  of  the  people  and  its 
conception as essentially procedural should be perceived as an 
improvement  to  democratic  theory  (e.g.  Espejo  2011,  182; 
Abizadeh 2012). Furthermore, it is not, in my opinion, a deficit 
of democratic theory that the demos cannot be initially defined 
in a legitimate way. The fact that the basis of democracy itself is  
subject to scrutiny reveals that democracy is at its core a process 
and, as Dahl has already noted, that the demos is itself a political 
question.
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